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ABSTRACT
Everywhere the Internet goes, new legal problems are sure to follow.
As social media expands and infiltrates our daily lives, society must grapple
with how to extend the law to modern situations. This problem becomes
increasingly pressing as more and more of our social interactions take place
online. For example, Facebook has become a colossal gathering place for
friends, families, co-workers, frenemies, and others to disseminate their
ideas and share information. Sometimes Facebook replaces old institutions;
other times it augments them. Where once a neighbor would show
allegiance to a political candidate by staking a sign on the front lawn, a user
now clicks Like on a candidate’s Facebook Page instead.
In 2009, a deputy sheriff was fired for doing just that. A U.S. district
court, in an opinion that demonstrates the inability of the current legal
framework to adequately address social-media activity, held that the
termination did not violate the deputy sheriff’s First Amendment rights.
The judge reasoned that clicking Like does not constitute speech—let alone
protected speech—because it is not substantive.
This Article demonstrates that the court not only failed to follow wellestablished Supreme Court precedent, but also fundamentally
misunderstood the technological consequences of clicking Like, which
include textual statements as well as the symbolic thumbs up sign. Liking a
political candidate’s Facebook Page is the twenty-first century equivalent of
a campaign yard sign and, under the Supreme Court’s First Amendment
jurisprudence, should be considered protected speech.
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INTRODUCTION

Imagine being fired for liking a political candidate . . . on Facebook.
As unlikely as this experience may seem, a federal court recently held that
an employer could do just that. Facebook, a social-networking website with
more than one billion active users,1 has become ubiquitous, raising new
legal concerns everywhere the Internet reaches. As societies grapple with
how to incorporate Facebook activity into their legal systems, they are
writing new laws and struggling to apply old ones to novel social-media
scenarios.2 For example, the government of the Philippines recently
1. Geoffrey A. Fowler, Facebook: One Billion and Counting, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 4, 2012),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443635404578036164027386112.html.
2. See, e.g., Hunter v. Va. State Bar, 2013 WL 749494 (Va. Feb. 28, 2013) (discussing
whether an attorney’s blog, which primarily contained posts about cases in which the attorney had
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enacted—and quickly suspended—legislation that includes exceedingly
broad language on what constitutes online libel, arguably criminalizing
Liking or Sharing3 content written by another author.4 In India, a student
faced three criminal charges for clicking Like on a friend’s political
Facebook Status Update.5 Following a public outcry, the government
dropped the charges and suspended her arrestors.6
Although the thought of criminalizing Liking or Sharing may seem
outlandish in the United States,7 whether such actions merit protection
under the Constitution remains unsettled. Social-media activity is testing
the traditional boundaries of the First Amendment—including what
constitutes speech and whether that speech is protected. Recently, in Bland
v. Roberts,8 a federal district court held that Liking a candidate’s campaign
reached favorable results, constituted commercial speech under the First Amendment). The
majority held that an attorney’s blog posts constituted commercial speech that was not protected
by the First Amendment because they were potentially misleading. Id. at *9. Two judges,
however, asserted that the blogs were protected political speech. Id. at *11 (Lemons, J., dissenting
in part). Further, Congress has introduced several new bills, including the Cyber Intelligence
Sharing and Protection Act, which would enable the government to collect private user
information from social-networking companies without a warrant. See Gregory Ferenstein, Hey
Internet, Where’s the Outrage?, WASH. POST IDEAS@INNOVATIONS BLOG (Mar. 13, 2013, 2:27
PM),http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/innovations/post/hey-internet-wheres-the-outrage/201
3/03/13/caf1f4b2-8c03-11e2-b63f-f53fb9f2fcb4_blog.html.
3. See infra notes 19-27 and accompanying text (explaining the concept of Liking a post
or Page on Facebook).
4. See Paul Tassi, Controversial Cybercrime Prevention Act Suspended by Philippines
Court, FORBES (Oct. 9, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/insertcoin/2012/10/09/controversialcybercrime-prevention-act-suspended-by-philippines-court (indicating that a Philippines court
suspended the law less than one month after its enactment in response to public outrage). Protests
erupted because the Act’s broad language potentially criminalized distributing or endorsing online
commentary critical of the government or other state actors. Cybercrime Law Is Suspended by
Philippines Court, BBC NEWS (Oct. 9, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-19881346.
5. Shivam Vij, Woman Hits “Like” on Facebook, Gets Arrested in India, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR (Nov. 12, 2012),http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2012/1119/Wo
man-hits-like-on-Facebook-gets-arrested-in-India. The student had Liked a friend’s Status Update
that criticized Mumbai’s mourning the death of a violent political leader. Id. The friend, who was
also arrested, posted: “Respect is earned, not given and definitely not forced. Today Mumbai
shuts down due to fear and not due to respect.” Id.
6. Julie McCarthy, Facebook Arrests Ignite Free-Speech Debate in India, NPR (Nov. 29,
2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/11/29/166118379/arrests-ignite-free-speech-debate-in-india. The
student faced three charges, including one under India’s controversial Information Technology
Act that prohibits online speech of “grossly offensive or of menacing character.” Vij, supra note
5. The possible penalty for just this one click was up to nine years in prison. Id.
7. While the United States has not considered laws as severe as those of the Philippines or
India, the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA), proposed in December 2011, would have created
restrictions on online speech in an effort to reduce online piracy and copyright infringement. See
James L. Gattuso, Online Piracy and SOPA: Beware of Unintended Consequences, HERITAGE
FOUND. (Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/12/online-piracy-andsopa-beware-of-unintended-consequences (arguing that restrictions placed on websites and
individuals may violate free speech rights).
8. 857 F. Supp. 2d 599 (E.D. Va. 2012).
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Page on Facebook does not constitute protected speech at all because it was
“not the kind of substantive statement that has previously warranted
constitutional protection.”9 Therefore, the judge in Bland held that a public
employer could fire an employee for such activity without violating the
First Amendment.10 An NLRB administrative law judge (ALJ), however,
found in Three D, LLC11 that an employee could not be fired for Liking a
Facebook post critical of an employer under the “concerted activity”
protection of the National Labor Relations Act.12 Bland and Three D
demonstrate the ongoing struggle to apply current laws to novel forms of
online communication and illustrate that some Facebook activity is
substantive enough to garner protection.
This Article argues that clicking Like on Facebook, as well as similar
online actions, constitutes speech for First Amendment purposes and should
be protected in certain circumstances. Part II introduces Facebook and its
features, First Amendment jurisprudence in the public-employment context,
and the Bland and Three D cases. Part III argues that Liking something on
Facebook constitutes speech under the First Amendment. This Part
concludes by demonstrating that the free speech analysis in Bland fell far
short of justifying the ruling that Liking a political candidate’s campaign
Page is not protected speech. More generally, the Article concludes that
courts should bring many online activities within the scope of First
Amendment protection.
II.

BACKGROUND

The First Amendment protects the right to freedom of speech.13
Society’s conception about what constitutes speech has evolved over time
and now encompasses many forms of symbolic expression in addition to
pure speech. The novel forms of expression effectuated by the advent of
the Internet and social media have stretched the bounds of free speech
jurisprudence and have necessitated a reevaluation—by both society and the
courts—of the scope of First Amendment protections, particularly in the
public-employment context.

9. Id. at 604.
10. Id. at 603-04.
11. Three D, LLC, No. 34-CA-12915, 2012 WL 76862 (N.L.R.B. Jan. 3, 2012).
12. Id. at *1.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Supreme Court has explicitly incorporated the Free
Speech Clause and applied it to the states via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (asserting that freedom of speech is
“among the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States”).
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Facebook, “Liking,” and Other Social-Media Features

Facebook is a free social-networking website that enables users “to
connect with their friends and family, to discover what is going on in the
world around them, and to share what matters to them and to the people
they care about.”14 Users include individuals and organized entities, such as
groups, businesses, and public figures. Facebook Pages are designed for
organized entities to convey information, interests, ideas, photographs, and
other multimedia.15 Facebook Profiles16 provide similar functionality for
individual users, who can make such content viewable to either a specific
audience or the public.17 Users frequently disseminate such information
through the Like and Share functions.18
The Like button is depicted by a thumbs-up symbol and the word
“Like”; according to Facebook, this provides a means to “[g]ive positive
feedback and connect with things you care about.”19 A user can Like Pages,
other users’ Comments and Status Updates, and Internet websites that
provide the Like function.20 Liking a Page has multiple effects: (1) the Like
shows up on the user’s Timeline as a statement notification; (2) a
permanent symbol appears in a separate location listing all Pages a user has
Liked; (3) a Like notice is posted on the News Feeds of other users; and (4)
the user’s photo and name “appear on the Page as a person who likes that

14. Brief of Facebook, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant Daniel Ray
Carter, Jr. and in Support of Vacatur at 1, Bland v. Roberts, 857 F. Supp. 2d 599 (E.D. Va. 2012)
(No. 12-16771), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/bland_v._roberts_appeal___facebook_amicus_brief.pdf [hereinafter Facebook Brief].
15. Id. at 4; see, What is a Facebook Page?, FACEBOOK, https://www. facebook.com/
help/174987089221178 (last visited June 9, 2013). For example, during the 2012 presidential
election, Pages for President Barack Obama and Mitt Romney were used to continually update
followers on the candidates’ policies and campaigns. See Organizing for Action, Barack Obama,
FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/barackobama (last visited June 9, 2013); Mitt Romney,
FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/mittromney (last visited June 9, 2013).
16. A Facebook Profile is now called a “Timeline,” which has a different layout but serves
a similar function. See Facebook Brief, supra note 14, at 4. Profiles and Timelines display the
user’s recent Facebook activity as well as a separate list of all Pages a user has Liked. See id.
17. Id.
18. Facebook users generate an average of 2.7 billion Likes and Comments per day.
Donna Tam, Facebook Processes More than 500 TB of Data Daily, CNET (Aug. 22, 2012, 2:02
PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57498531-93/facebook-processes-more-than-500-tb-ofdata-daily.
19. Like, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/452446998120360 (last visited
June 9, 2013).
20. Facebook Brief, supra note 14, at 4. Similar functions are available on other socialmedia platforms, such as the Favorite function on Twitter and the Like and Follow functions on
Pinterest. See What is a Favorite?, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/14214-aboutfavorites-and-where-to-find-them (last visited June 9, 2013); Pinning 101, PINTEREST,
https://about.pinterest.com/basics (last visited June 9, 2013).
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Page.”21 A user has the ability to tailor who can view this information22 and
can remove the Like at any time by clicking Unlike.23
Sharing is another method of disseminating information on
Facebook,24 either internally through Facebook or externally via third-party
websites.25 A user Shares by clicking a button beneath content on
Facebook or by utilizing a third party’s post-to-Facebook function.26 Users
can Share content including photos, videos, websites, news articles, other
users’ comments and posts, and online promotions or other advertising.
The content appears both on the user’s Profile as well as on the News Feeds
of other users.27 These novel forms of communication raise difficult and
fascinating First Amendment questions that courts have yet to resolve.
B.

What Constitutes Speech Under the First Amendment?

The Supreme Court has long recognized that freedom of speech is a
fundamental right.28 This characterization “reflects the belief of the framers
of the Constitution that exercise of the right[] lies at the foundation of free
government by free men.”29 Over time, Supreme Court jurisprudence has
evolved regarding what constitutes speech for First Amendment purposes.
The First Amendment affords the most stringent protections to “pure
speech,” which is defined as “[w]ords or conduct limited in form to what is
necessary to convey the idea.”30 Pure speech encompasses both written and
spoken words.31 Any governmental infringement on such speech receives
21. Facebook Brief, supra note 14, at 6-7 (describing the effects of clicking Like and
providing examples); Like, supra note 19. Liking specific content, as opposed to an entire Page,
differs only in that doing so does not add the liked content to the user’s permanent listing of Likes.
See What’s the Difference Between Liking an Item a Friend Posts and Liking a Page?,
FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/228578620490361 (last visited June 9, 2013).
22. What Does It Mean to Like a Page or Content Off of Facebook?, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/help/131263873618748 (last visited June 9, 2013).
23. How Do I Unlike Something?, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/
226926007324633 (last visited June 9, 2013).
24. See Sharing, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/418076994900119 (last
visited June 9, 2013) (describing how users can Share various content that appears in their News
Feeds).
25. Id. Other social-media platforms have similar functionalities as Sharing, such as the
Re-Tweet option on Twitter and the Repin function on Pinterest. See FAQs About Retweets (RT),
TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/77606-what-is-retweet-rt (last visited June 9, 2013)
(“A retweet is a re-posting of someone else’s Tweet. Twitter’s retweet feature helps you and
others quickly share that Tweet with all of your followers.”); Pinning 101, supra note 20.
26. What Does It Mean to Like a Page or Content Off of Facebook?, supra note 22.
27. Id.
28. Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939).
29. Id.
30. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1529 (9th ed. 2009).
31. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 518, 527 (2001) (finding that a delivery
of a tape recording is protected speech). The Bartnicki Court explained:
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the highest level of scrutiny.32
Although the Free Speech Clause, by its terms, protects only “speech,”
the Court has acknowledged that symbolic acts can also constitute speech
under the First Amendment.33 Recognizing that symbolism is a “primitive
but effective” means of communication, the Supreme Court declared that
the First Amendment “looks beyond written or spoken words as mediums
of expression.”34 The Court extended protection to symbolic conduct as
early as 1931 in Stromberg v. California,35 in which the Court invalidated
California’s criminal prohibition on waving a red flag as an emblem of
governmental opposition.36 In finding the law void for vagueness, the
Court recognized that this symbolic display was speech.37 Subsequently,
the Court has held that several different types of symbolic acts constitute
speech.38 In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District,39 for example, the Supreme Court held that wearing armbands in
protest of the Vietnam War was symbolic speech protected by the First
Amendment.40
Not all conduct, however, rises to the level of speech; only
communicative conduct qualifies as speech for First Amendment purposes.
The Court has articulated a two-pronged test for determining what conduct

[G]iven that the purpose of [delivering a tape recording] is to provide the recipient with
the text of recorded statements, it is like the delivery of a handbill or a pamphlet, and as
such, it is the kind of “speech” that the First Amendment protects. . . . [I]f the acts of
“disclosing” and “publishing” information do not constitute [pure] speech, it is hard to
imagine what does fall within that category, as distinct from the category of expressive
conduct.
Id. (emphasis added; footnote, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted).
32. See, e.g., id. at 534 (applying strict scrutiny to invalidate a restriction on disclosure of
illegally intercepted oral communications, which the court classified as pure speech).
33. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1063
(3d ed. 2006) (“To deny First Amendment protection for [symbolic speech] would mean a loss of
some of the most effective means of communicating messages.”).
34. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995) (quoting
W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943)); see Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,
404 (1989) (asserting that the Supreme Court has “long recognized that its protection does not end
at the spoken or written word”).
35. 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
36. See id. at 361.
37. See id. at 369-70 (“The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to
the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be
obtained by lawful means . . . is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system. A statute
which . . . is so vague and indefinite as to permit the punishment of the fair use of this opportunity
is repugnant to the guaranty of liberty contained in the Fourteenth Amendment.”). The Court
went even further by holding that the speech was protected. See id.
38. See, e.g., Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141-42 (1966) (holding that a peaceful
sit-in protesting segregation constituted speech under the First Amendment).
39. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
40. Id. at 505-06.
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is sufficiently communicative to fall within the scope of the First
Amendment. In its 1974 Spence v. California41 decision, the Supreme
Court analyzed whether a peace sign attached to an upside-down American
flag constitutes speech.42
In concluding that this conduct was
communicative speech, the Court emphasized two factors: “[a]n intent to
convey a particularized message was present, and in the surrounding
circumstances the likelihood was great that the message would be
understood by those who viewed it.”43
Fifteen years later, the Court in Texas v. Johnson44 formalized the
Spence factors into the two-pronged Spence-Johnson test, under which
conduct is considered speech for First Amendment purposes if there is (1)
an intent to convey a particularized message, and (2) a great likelihood that
the message would be understood by those encountering it.45 The Johnson
Court applied this test to find that burning a flag in protest constituted
speech.46 In so holding, the Court emphasized that, although it previously
had refused to adopt “the view that an apparently limitless variety of
conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the
conduct intends thereby to express an idea,” it has also acknowledged that
some conduct is “sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to
fall within the scope of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”47
Only six years later, the Court seemingly relaxed the particularized
message prong of the Spence-Johnson test in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian & Bisexual Group.48 In Hurley, the Court briefly acknowledged its
Spence holding but explained that “a narrow, succinctly articulable message
is not a condition of constitutional protection, which if confined to
expressions conveying a ‘particularized message,’ would never reach the
unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold
Schöenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll.”49 Thus, an activity
may constitute speech under the First Amendment even if it does not

41. 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (per curiam).
42. See id. at 405-06 (invalidating a Washington statute forbidding the display of a U.S.
flag with any superimposed words or symbols).
43. Id. at 410-11.
44. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
45. Id. at 404.
46. Id. at 405-06.
47. Id. at 404 (quoting United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 375 (1968), and Spence,
418 U.S. at 409 (per curiam)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
48. See 515 U.S. 557, 569-71 (1995); Angelica M. Sinopole, Comment, “No Saggy
Pants”: A Review of the First Amendment Issues Presented by the State’s Regulation of Fashion
in Public Streets, 113 PENN. ST. L. REV. 329, 342-43 (2008) (stating that, although the Supreme
Court has never expressly clarified whether the Hurley decision altered the Spence-Johnson
particularized message requirement, many lower courts have interpreted the decision as doing so).
49. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569 (internal citation omitted).
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convey a clear message,50 and an idea or message need not be original to be
speech.51 The Hurley Court applied these principles to hold that marching
in a parade constitutes symbolic speech because the marchers make “some
sort of collective point” to each other and to bystanders.52
An expansive variety of expressive acts constitutes symbolic speech
under these principles. The inquiry, however, does not end after
establishing that specific conduct is speech for purposes of the First
Amendment; courts must then examine whether the speech is protected.
C.

What Constitutes Protected Speech Under the First Amendment?

After concluding that an individual engaged in speech, a court must
determine whether that speech is protected under the First Amendment.
Freedom of speech is not an absolute right53—the government may regulate
or even bar some categories of speech. For example, fighting words,54
criminal speech,55 incitement of illegal action,56 and obscenity57 enjoy no
protection under the First Amendment and may thus be banned outright.
Political speech and speech on matters of public concern, on the other hand,
receive strict scrutiny, and the government may restrict such speech only for
compelling reasons. In some contexts, such as in public workplaces and
public schools, the Supreme Court has set out special rules to analyze
speech restrictions.

50. See id. at 569-70.
51. See, e.g., id. at 575 (comparing the selection of parade participants to the selection of
advertisements in a daily paper and finding that both constituted speech within the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment); Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 636
(1994) (holding that cable operators had been engaged in speech even though they were
presenting compilations of programming originally produced by others).
52. See, e.g., Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573 (holding that a Massachusetts law violated the
parade organizers’ First Amendment rights by requiring private parade organizers to include a
group imparting a message with which the organizers disagreed).
53. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (stating that the freedom of
speech guaranteed by the First Amendment does not grant an authority that protects all uses of
language, nor does it prohibit the punishment of a person who abuses the freedom).
54. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (establishing the
test for fighting words to be “what men of common intelligence would understand [to] be words
likely to cause an average addressee to fight”).
55. See, e.g., Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949) (declaring
that speech does not receive First Amendment protection when it is “used as an integral part of
conduct [that is] in violation of a valid criminal statute” (emphasis added)).
56. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (stating that the government
may proscribe advocacy to violate the law or use force when such advocacy “is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action”).
57. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1973) (creating a more flexible
three-prong test for determining whether speech is obscene, and thus not protected by the First
Amendment, and rejecting an “utterly without redeeming social value” test).
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Political Speech

The underlying purpose of the First Amendment is to protect and
foster free discussion of government.58 At the heart of the First
Amendment—where the Constitution provides the highest level of
protection—lies political speech, which includes “criticism of government
policy; dissent from the political status quo; direct social advocacy of
alternative policies; sharply offensive attacks on prevailing conventions;
denunciations of the law itself.”59 Because political speech is key to the
decision-making process of a democracy,60 the Supreme Court views laws
restricting such speech with the most stringent level of scrutiny.61
The medium of communication can be an important factor in a First
Amendment analysis involving political or other speech, and residential
signs are a particularly valuable medium.62 In City of Ladue v. Gilleo,63 the
Court held that a city’s ban on all residential signs was unconstitutional and
emphasized the traditional importance of such signs under the First

58. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966) (“Whatever differences may exist
about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a major
purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs. This of
course includes discussions of candidates, structures and forms of government, the manner in
which government is operated or should be operated, and all such matters relating to political
processes.”).
59. WILLIAM V. VAN ALSTYNE, THE AMERICAN FIRST AMENDMENT IN THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY: CASES AND MATERIALS 167 (4th ed. 2011).
60. See First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 n.11 (1978) (noting that
the government’s “special incentive to repress opposition” necessitates heightened scrutiny of
laws restricting political speech (internal quotations omitted)); see also Connick v. Myers, 461
U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (“The First Amendment was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of
ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.” (internal
citations omitted)). Restrictions on political speech often arise in the context of elections and
campaign finance. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), held that two types of
campaign funding constitute political speech: direct contributions to candidates and candidatefunded campaign expenditures. Id. at 43-45. In this case, the Court accepted as a sufficiently
compelling interest the government’s argument that the restrictions on direct contributions to
candidates were necessary to prevent quid pro quo corruption. Id. at 26-27. However, it rejected
that argument as a justification for the limitations placed on expenditures from candidates’
personal and family accounts, maintaining such restrictions as improper burdens on the First
Amendment right to campaign for oneself. Id. at 45. The Court therefore invalidated the
restrictions on candidate-funded expenditures but upheld the restrictions on contributions. Id. at
143-44. Subsequently, the Court in Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), stated that
political expenditures are by their definition political speech. Id. at 360. The Citizens United
Court also held that a film urging viewers to vote against Hillary Clinton before the 2008
presidential primary elections constituted express advocacy, a basic form of political speech. Id.
at 326.
61. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340.
62. See, e.g., Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (prohibiting live
entertainment); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (banning door to door
distribution of literature).
63. 512 U.S. 43 (1994).
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Amendment, whether they express political, religious, or other views.64
The Court distinguished residential signs from public signs because, unlike
residential signs, public signs are not a “uniquely valuable or important
mode of communication.”65 Front-lawn signs provide a unique opportunity
for speech because they provide information about the speaker’s identity,
which is “an important component of many attempts to persuade.”66
Indeed, the Court reasoned that “[d]isplaying a sign from one’s own
residence often carries a message quite distinct from placing the same sign
someplace else, or conveying the same text or picture by other means.”67
Moreover, yard signs are unusually inexpensive and convenient, and no
adequate alternative channels of expression exist, particularly for
individuals with low income or limited mobility.68 Finally, residential signs
allow speakers to target their messages to specific audiences, namely their
neighbors, and there is no suitable substitute to reach this audience as
effectively.69
2.

Public Figures and Matters of Public Concern

First Amendment protection also extends to speech regarding public
figures and matters of public concern. Speech about public figures received
heightened protection in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.70 Emphasizing
the historic importance of citizens’ ability to criticize the government and
elected officials, the Court held unconstitutional a legislatively imposed
fine for libel of state officials printed in a newspaper advertisement.71 The
Supreme Court thereby created a privilege for speakers targeting public
officials72 or public figures.73
64. Id. at 54.
65. Compare id. (prohibiting complete ban on residential signs), with Members of City
Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1994) (permitting restrictions on signs placed on
public property).
66. City of Ladue, 512 U.S. at 56.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 57.
69. Id.
70. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
71. Id. at 272.
72. A person who holds a paid governmental position is considered a public official. See
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974) (adding that those who merely appear in
court are not considered public officials because such a holding would “sweep all lawyers under
the New York Times rule as officers of the court”).
73. See N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 279 (noting that such a rule had already been adopted in
many states). A person’s status as a public figure is determined based on one’s notoriety or
fame—either in all contexts or in relation to a particular controversy—and is established “by
looking to the nature and extent of an individual’s participation in the particular controversy.” See
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352 (maintaining that since the petitioner did not comment on the litigation at
issue, he “did not thrust himself into the vortex of this public issue”).
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In Time, Inc. v. Hill,74 the Court broadened the protection given to
speech involving public figures to include all speech on matters of public
concern.75 The speech at issue was a magazine article about the release of a
play that was based on a story involving the plaintiffs.76 The Court held
that the article was on a matter of public concern, and thereby enjoyed
heightened protection, because it discussed “the opening of a new play
linked to an actual incident” that had been prominent in the news.77
Whether speech constitutes a matter of public concern is a crucial element
to First Amendment analysis, particularly in the public-employment
context.
3.

The First Amendment and Employee Speech

The First Amendment protects not only the right to freedom of speech,
but also the right to be free from government retaliation for exercising that
right. This non-retaliation principle derives from the general rule that the
government may not condition a benefit on a basis that infringes a person’s
constitutionally protected rights—including the right to free speech—even
though that person has no entitlement to the benefit in the first place.78 By
this reasoning, a public employer cannot deny continued employment to its
employees, or retaliate against them,79 for exercising their right to speak.80
74. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
75. The Court has found speech to be about a matter of public concern in a variety of
situations. For example, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001), protected the dissemination of
stolen material when the disseminator obtained the information legally because the speech
involved a matter of public concern. Id. at 525. Bartnicki involved a conversation between a
union negotiator and union president about a collective-bargaining settlement that was recorded
by an illegal wiretap and later played on a radio show. Id. at 520. Even though the third party had
recorded the conversation illegally, the “stranger’s illegal conduct [did] not suffice to remove the
First Amendment shield from speech about a matter of public concern.” Id. at 535. Also, Snyder
v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011), granted First Amendment protection to picketers at a military
serviceman’s funeral, holding that although the signs were held at a private funeral and contained
some messages targeted at a few individuals, the “overall thrust and dominant theme of [the]
demonstration spoke to broader public issues,” including “the political and moral conduct of the
United States and its citizens, the fate of our Nation, homosexuality in the military, and scandals
involving the Catholic clergy.” Id. at 1217.
76. Time, 385 U.S. at 377-80.
77. Id. at 387-88 (indicating that the play depicted a violent hostage situation, whereas the
plaintiffs maintained that they had been held in their home against their will by calm and
respectful men).
78. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 59 (2006)
(applying the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and stating “the government may not deny a
benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected . . . freedom of speech
even if he has no entitlement to that benefit” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Am.
Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 210 (2003))).
79. The Supreme Court has established that plaintiffs carry the burden of showing that
their First Amendment activity was a substantial or motivating factor in their employers’ alleged
retaliatory conduct. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
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An employee’s speech right is not the only interest at stake, however.
Public employers also have a legitimate interest in ensuring the efficient
operation of the workplace.81
The Supreme Court has formulated a test for speech in the publicemployment context in an attempt to balance these conflicting interests
fairly. Public-employee speech is protected under the First Amendment if
(1) the employee speaks as a citizen on a “matter of public concern,”82 and
(2) the employee’s speech interest outweighs the government’s interest in
“promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs.”83 If
employees are speaking pursuant to their “official duties,” then they are not
speaking as citizens and the speech is not protected.84 The government is
free to regulate unprotected speech or even to fire employees for engaging
in it.85
In Pickering v. Board of Education,86 the Court established a
balancing test for weighing whose interests are greater—the publicemployee speaker or the government employer. The Court set forth factors
to consider when balancing an employee’s speech interest against the state’s
administrative efficiency interest,87 including: whether the speech interferes
with maintaining both discipline and harmony in the workplace;88 whether
the employee has a “close working relationship[]” with the person whom
the speech criticizes, such that “personal loyalty and confidence are
necessary to the[] proper functioning” of that relationship;89 whether the
speech interferes with the employee’s “daily duties” in the workplace;90 and
whether the speech interferes with the normal operation of the workplace.91

80. See, e.g., Adams v. Trs. of the Univ. of N.C.-Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550, 560 (4th Cir.
2011) (stating that the “First Amendment protects not only the affirmative right to speak, but also
the ‘right to be free from retaliation by a public official for the exercise of that right’” (quoting
Suarez Corp. Indus. v. McGraw, 202 F.3d 676, 685 (4th Cir. 2000))).
81. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
82. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983).
83. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
84. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
85. See id. at 424 (permitting the termination of a deputy district attorney for engaging in
unprotected speech).
86. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
87. Administrative efficiency is the sole state interest to be weighed in the balancing test.
See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987) (“[T]he very nature of the balancing test[]
make[s] apparent that the state interest element of the test focuses on the effective functioning of
the public employer’s enterprise. Interference with work, personnel relationships, or the speaker’s
job performance can detract from the public employer’s function; avoiding such interference can
be a strong state interest.”).
88. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 572-73.
91. Id. at 573.
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At issue in Pickering was the retaliatory termination of a teacher who
had written a letter, published in a local newspaper, attacking the school
board’s allocation of financial resources and criticizing the superintendent.92
The teacher challenged his termination on the ground that the letter was
protected by the First Amendment.93 The Court agreed and found that the
letter constituted protected speech for which the teacher could not be
terminated94 because, in this instance, the teacher’s interest in commenting
on matters of public concern95 outweighed the state’s interest in regulating
the teacher’s speech.96 The Court emphasized that teachers are in a unique
position to contribute meaningfully to the public debate on how best to
allocate school funds because teachers, by the nature of their employment
and day-to-day interactions at their schools, are the most likely to have
definite and knowledgeable opinions on how to spend school funds.97
Accordingly, the Court stated, “it is essential that they be able to speak out
freely on such questions without fear of retaliatory dismissal.”98
In Connick v. Myers,99 the Court modified the Pickering test by adding
a threshold requirement that the employee speech be on a matter of public
concern before courts can proceed to the balancing portion of the test.100
The Court elaborated that speech addresses a matter of public concern when
“the content, form, and context of a given statement”101 relates “to any
matter of political, social, or other concern to the community.”102 After
articulating this threshold requirement, the Court attempted to clarify the
balancing test by stating that the relevant considerations should include the
time, place, and manner of the speech at issue, as well as the context of the
92. Id. at 566-67.
93. Id. at 565.
94. Id. at 574 (stating that even the “threat of dismissal from public employment is . . . a
potent means of inhibiting speech” and could therefore violate the First Amendment (emphasis
added)).
95. Id. at 571-72 (ruling that the statements in the letter were on matters of public concern
because the letter criticized the school board’s policy choices in allocating taxpayer funds).
96. Id. at 572-73 (finding that the letter did not impede the teacher’s ability to perform his
classroom duties or interfere with the normal operation of the school). The Court also noted that
the teacher’s “employment relationships with the Board and, to a somewhat lesser extent, with the
superintendent are not the kind of close working relationships for which it can persuasively be
claimed that personal loyalty and confidence are necessary to their proper functioning.” Id. at
570.
97. Id. at 571-72.
98. Id. at 572.
99. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
100. Id. at 146.
101. Id. at 147-48.
102. Id. at 146 (emphasis added) (“When employee expression cannot be fairly
considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community,
government officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive
oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment.”).
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speech.103 Finally, the Court noted that the state’s burden of proving the
disruptive nature of the employee’s speech varies, depending on whether
“the employee’s speech more substantially involved matters of public
concern.”104
Applying these principles, the Connick Court addressed whether an
assistant district attorney’s First Amendment rights were violated when she
was terminated for distributing an office survey.105 The Court determined
that most of the questionnaire addressed matters of personal interest
regarding internal employment procedures rather than matters of public
concern and that the speech was therefore unprotected.106 The only portion
of the questionnaire that the Court deemed related to a matter of public
concern was a question regarding political campaigns.107 On this question
alone, the Court applied the Pickering balancing test and concluded that the
disruptive time, place, and manner in which the questionnaire was
distributed,108 as well as the state’s interest in maintaining close working
relationships, outweighed the employee’s interests, which were minimal
because the questionnaire only touched on a matter of public concern in a
limited sense.109 The Court therefore concluded that the employee’s
termination did not violate the First Amendment.110
Garcetti v. Ceballos111 added the most recent piece to the publicemployee-speech puzzle. The Garcetti Court limited the meaning of
“citizen” as that term is used in the threshold step of the Pickering-Connick
test. Garcetti held that when public employees speak “pursuant to their
official duties,” they are not speaking as citizens; rather, they are speaking
as employees, and therefore their employers are free to discipline them for
that speech.112 If a public employee is not speaking as a citizen, then that
speech is not protected regardless of whether the speech implicates a matter
of public concern,113 and the court does not reach the balancing test.
Speech is considered as being pursuant to official duties when it “owes its

103. Id. at 152-53.
104. Id. at 152.
105. Id. at 141.
106. Id. at 148. The survey inquired into her colleagues’ opinions on internal office
policy, supervisor job performance, office morale, and institutional pressure to support political
campaigns. Id. at 141.
107. Id. at 149.
108. Id. at 153 (noting that “the questionnaire was prepared and distributed at the office[
such that] the manner of distribution required not only [the employee] to leave her work, but for
others to do the same in order that the questionnaire be completed”).
109. Id. at 154 (emphasizing that the questionnaire was primarily a personal grievance).
110. Id.
111. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
112. Id. at 421.
113. Id.
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existence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities” or, in other
words, when it is part of what the speaker was hired to do.114
In Garcetti, Deputy District Attorney Ceballos claimed that his
employer retaliated against him after he recommended that a case be
dismissed on the basis of purported governmental misconduct in obtaining a
key warrant.115 The Court held that Ceballos’s speech was not protected
and explained that “the fact that Ceballos spoke as a prosecutor fulfilling a
responsibility to advise his supervisor about how best to proceed with a
pending case—distinguishes Ceballos’s case from those in which the First
Amendment provides protection against discipline.”116
D.

“Liking” as Speech: Bland v. Roberts and Three D, LLC

Recently, social media, public employment, and the First Amendment
collided in the Bland and Three D cases. In Bland, a federal district court
in Virginia, in an employment-termination matter, decided that Liking
something on Facebook does not constitute speech and, therefore, does not
warrant First Amendment protection.117 Six former employees of the
Hampton Sheriff’s Office brought suit against the Sheriff for violating their
First Amendment rights by terminating their employment when he won
reelection.118 Each of the employees had supported the Sheriff’s opponent,
Jim Adams, in various public and private ways;119 they alleged that the
Sheriff knew about their support and fired them in retaliation.120
Specifically, plaintiff Carter had supported the Sheriff’s opponent by
Liking his Facebook Page.121 The court began its analysis of whether the
online behavior was protected speech by looking at the Fourth Circuit’s
iteration of the Pickering-Connick test.122 As a threshold matter, however,

114. Id.
115. Id. at 413-15.
116. Id. at 421.
117. Bland v. Roberts, 857 F. Supp. 2d 599, 604 (E.D. Va. 2012).
118. Id. at 602.
119. See id. at 603-05 (describing various activities by which the six plaintiffs supported
the Sheriff’s opposition, including Facebook activity, bumper-sticker display, voting behavior,
and private thoughts).
120. Id. at 602.
121. Id. at 603.
122. Id. Bland cited the test in McVey v. Stacy, 157 F.3d 271 (4th Cir. 1998), in which the
circuit court elaborated on the factors to be considered under Pickering-Connick. These factors
include:
whether the employee’s speech (1) impairs discipline by superiors; (2) impairs harmony
among co-workers; (3) has a detrimental impact on close working relationships; (4)
impedes the performance of the public employee’s duties; (5) interferes with the
operation of the agency; (6) undermines the mission of the agency; (7) is communicated
to the public or to co-workers in private; (8) conflicts with the responsibilities of the
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the activity needed to qualify as speech.123 The court determined that
merely Liking a Facebook Page is insufficient to be considered speech for
First Amendment purposes because it is not “substantive.”124 The lack of a
substantive statement, in the court’s analysis, distinguished the matter at
hand from other Facebook cases that involved more substantial activity.125
The court also noted the difficulty of inferring what Carter’s Like actually
meant.126 For these reasons, the court declined to recognize his Like as
speech and thus did not proceed to the Pickering-Connick analysis of
whether it constituted protected speech under the First Amendment.127
Only one other court has directly addressed the implications of Liking
something on Facebook. In a recent NLRB decision by an ALJ,128
terminated employees relied on the National Labor Relations Act of 1935
because, as private employees, they had no recourse under the First
Amendment.129
One of the employees had Liked his colleagues’
conversation thread on Facebook discussing their paychecks and suggesting
that their boss had mishandled their tax filing.130 He was subsequently
fired.131 While this case addressed Section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act, which pertains specifically to freedom of association and
other collective-bargaining rights,132 the ALJ’s analysis supports the idea
that this conduct constituted speech by pointing out that Liking makes a
“meaningful contribution to [a] discussion.”133

employee within the agency; and (9) makes use of the authority and public
accountability the employee’s role entails.
Id. (quoting Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
123. Id. (quoting McVey, 157 F.3d 271; citing Rankin, 483 U.S. 378).
124. Id. at 604.
125. See id. (noting that Gresham v. City of Atlanta, No. 1:10-CV-1301-RWS-CS, 2011
WL 4601022, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 29, 2011), and Mattingly v. Milligan, No. 4:11CV00215, 2011
WL 5184283, at *2-3 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 1, 2011), both involved textual statements rather than
clicking activity).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 603.
128. See Three D, LLC, No. 34-CA-12915, 2012 WL 76862, at *1 (N.L.R.B. Jan. 3,
2012) (finding that the employment had been terminated as a result of the employees’ “protected
concerted activities”).
129. See Melanie Trottman, For Angry Employees, Legal Cover for Rants, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 2, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203710704577049822809710332
.html (indicating that the National Labor Relations Act provides private employees with recourse
for adverse employment actions). Constitutional protection only arises in the realm of state
action. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I (forbidding Congress from making laws that abridge the
freedom of speech).
130. Three D, 2012 WL 76862, at *3-4.
131. Id. at *5.
132. National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006)).
133. Three D, 2012 WL 76862, at *9.
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III. ANALYSIS
A.

Clicking “Like” on Facebook Constitutes Speech, Both as Pure
Speech and as Symbolic Speech

As the court in Bland correctly noted, in order for an act to be
protected it must first constitute speech, either pure or symbolic.
Otherwise, there is nothing to protect. The court, however, incorrectly
found that Carter’s action was not speech because he made no substantive
statement when he clicked Like. This conclusion ignores the critical point
that clicking Like generates textual statements that are pure speech, or,
alternatively, that clicking Like constitutes symbolic speech.
1.

Clicking Like on Facebook Constitutes Pure Speech

As previously explained, Liking a Page on Facebook has multiple
effects. By clicking Like, the user generates posts on the Liked Page, on
the user’s Timeline, and in the user’s biographical information, as well as in
other users’ News Feeds.134 These posts are all textual statements.135 When
Carter Liked Adams’ campaign Page, he triggered several events on
Facebook that textually conveyed his message of political support and
endorsement. Carter caused the slogan “Jim Adams for Hampton Sheriff”
and a picture of Adams to appear on Carter’s personal Profile Page.136
Further, Carter triggered announcements on his friends’ News Feeds and on
the Adams campaign Page stating that Carter Liked the campaign Page.137
In this way, when users click Like, they announce to other Facebook users
that they like whatever they have Liked.138
The court in Bland
distinguished Liking from other types of Facebook posts because the other
posts involved “actual statements.”139 This analysis missed the crucial
generative aspect of clicking Like by ignoring the actual words that users
produce when Liking a Page. The ALJ in Three D, however, recognized
that clicking Like was not just an act, but an action that created a textual
statement.140 Under this correct analysis, clicking Like constitutes pure
speech because it generates a textual statement.
134. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (describing the effects of Liking a Page).
135. See Ben Patterson, What Happens When You “Like” Something on Facebook?,
HERE’S THE THING (July 1, 2011), http://heresthethingblog.com/2011/07/01/facebook (noting that
a textual “blurb” is posted in various places on Facebook when a user clicks Like).
136. See Facebook Brief, supra note 14, at 7.
137. Id.
138. What Does It Mean to “Like” Something?, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/
help/110920455663362 (last visited June 9, 2013).
139. Bland v. Roberts, 857 F. Supp. 2d 599, 603-04 (E.D. Va. 2012).
140. Three D, No. 34-CA-12915, 2012 WL 76862 (N.L.R.B Jan. 3, 2012).
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Alternatively, Clicking Like Is Symbolic Speech

Even if clicking Like is not pure speech, it is symbolic speech because
it satisfies the Spence-Johnson test.141 The act of clicking Like is
“sufficiently imbued with elements of communication” because the user
intends to convey a message, and there is a great likelihood that the
message will be understood by its viewers.142 In Bland, Carter’s clicking
Like constituted symbolic speech.
First, by Liking the Adams campaign Page, Carter intended to convey
his support for the candidate.143 Regardless of the method—clicking Like
rather than writing an actual statement—the user is telling friends or even a
larger group of Facebook users about his or her personal beliefs and
opinions. When Carter Liked the Adams campaign Page, he was
expressing his political opinions and his support for a particular candidate, a
candidate who stands for certain policies and beliefs.144 Clicking Like on
the Page of a political candidate communicates a symbolic message of
support, much like burning a flag or wearing an armband expresses
solidarity with a political movement or ideal.145 The Supreme Court in
Texas v. Johnson acknowledged the expressive nature of such actions,
maintaining that the First Amendment’s protection does not require spoken
or written words.146 The Court has found that various symbolic acts are
akin to speech, including saluting a flag147 and peaceably protesting.148
Similarly, by clicking Like, Carter intended to convey a message of his
support for Adams and Adams’ campaign objectives.149

141. See supra text accompanying notes 41-45 (explaining that, under the Spence-Johnson
test, conduct is considered speech for First Amendment purposes if there is (1) an intent to convey
a particularized message, and (2) a great likelihood that the message would be understood by
those encountering it).
142. See supra text accompanying notes 41-45.
143. See Bland, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 601 (citing Carter’s Complaint, which stated that the
Sheriff had learned of Carter’s support for Adams via several actions by Carter, including the
Liking of Adams’ campaign Page on Facebook).
144. See Eugene Volokh, Is a Facebook “Like” Not “Substantive” Enough to “Warrant[]
Constitutional Protection”?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 29, 2012, 12:56 PM), http://www.
volokh.com/2012/04/29/is-a-facebook-like-not-substantive-enough-to-warrant-constitutional-protection (“A Facebook ‘like’ is a means of conveying a message of support for the thing you’re
liking. That’s the whole point of the ‘like’ button; that’s what people intend by clicking ‘like,’ and
that’s what viewers will perceive.”).
145. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06 (1969)
(holding that wearing armbands in schools constitutes protected speech).
146. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989).
147. See W.Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 634 (1943) (“There is no
doubt that . . . the flag salute is a form of utterance.”).
148. See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141-42 (1966) (extending First Amendment
protection to peaceable protestors gathered in a place where they had a right to be).
149. Bland v. Roberts, 857 F. Supp. 2d 599, 601 (E.D. Va. 2012).
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Second, this message was likely to be understood by those who
encountered it. Facebook users and the general public understand the
meaning of Like.150 In fact, Facebook users are so familiar with the Like
button that it is clicked more than 300,000 times every minute.151 Just as
flipping the middle finger—a commonly recognized and universally
understood gesture that usually conveys a message of disdain or
frustration—is within the purview of the First Amendment,152 so too is
giving a thumbs-up. Whether used online or not, this symbol is widely
employed and commonly perceived as a message of approval. But the court
did not have to rely solely on the commonly understood message that
clicking Like conveys; people who actually saw that Carter had Liked the
Adams campaign Page testified that they understood the message’s
meaning.153 For example, former Deputy Sheriff McCoy testified that, after
Carter Liked Adams’ campaign Page, “everybody was saying that [Carter
was] out of there because he supported Adams openly.”154 As demonstrated
by the witness’s belief that Carter was endorsing the candidate by clicking
Like on Adams’ campaign Page, Carter’s intended message was clearly
conveyed and understood by those who viewed it.
Even if clicking Like is not a clear and articulable message under the
Spence-Johnson test, it still meets the relaxed criteria set out in Hurley.155
If Carter did not convey a clear or articulable message by clicking Like on
Adams’ campaign Page, the Like at least conveyed some information about
Carter’s thoughts, opinions, or beliefs.156 Surely, the message was clearer
than that of a Pollock painting, a Schöenberg piece, or Lewis Carroll’s
Jabberwocky poem—all of which constitute speech.157
Additionally, there is a compelling public-policy reason to interpret

150. See Volokh, supra note 144 (explaining that, although Liking something does not
send a highly detailed message, “the First Amendment protects speech even when the speech is
not rich with logical argument, or is even vague or ambiguous”).
151. One Minute on Facebook, TIME, http://www.time.com/time/video/player/0,32068,
711054024001_2037229,00.html (last visited June 9, 2013).
152. See Ira P. Robbins, Digitus Impudicus: The Middle Finger and the Law, 41 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1403, 1407, 1483-84 (2008) (arguing that using the middle-finger gesture deserves
“stringent and steadfast First Amendment protection” as speech critical of the government).
153. Facebook Brief, supra note 14, at 16.
154. Id.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 50-52 (indicating that an activity may constitute
speech under the First Amendment even if it does not convey a clear message and that an idea or
message need not be original to be speech).
156. See Dominick Soar, What Does It Really Mean to Like Something on Facebook?,
BRANDWATCH (Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.brandwatch.com/2011/10/what-does-it-really-meanto-like-something-on-facebook (detailing some of the possible messages conveyed by clicking
Like).
157. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 569
(1995) (stating that these forms of expression were “unquestionably shielded”).
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Liking as speech, either pure or symbolic, particularly in a political context.
There is a strong analogy between Carter Liking Adams’ campaign Page
and political expression via residential campaign signs.158 Social media has
changed the landscape of political campaigns.159 It has provided political
candidates with a platform to share their ideas with others in an incredibly
fast and cost-effective manner and has enabled these candidates to reach
and garner support from much larger audiences.160 Moreover, social media
has enabled voters to become more involved in the political process.161
Clicking Like is simply a novel method of communication on the Internet
that allows users to voice their opinions of and support for political
candidates and ideas.
B.

Sharing Content also Constitutes Speech

Sharing, just as Liking, constitutes speech under the First
Amendment.162 A user Shares content by clicking a button on Facebook or
by clicking a third-party’s post-to-Facebook function.163 A user on
Facebook may Share photos, videos, websites, news articles, and any other
available third-party content.164 When the user Shares content, it appears on
the user’s Profile as well as on the News Feeds of the user’s friends.165
As long as the user, in distributing this content, intends to convey a
message that would be understood by the target audience, Sharing

158. See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text (emphasizing the strong First
Amendment protection afforded to residential yard signs in City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43
(1994), because of they provide a unique opportunity for speech that is inexpensive and
convenient).
159. See Sarah Amos, Social Media Changes Politics in the U.S., Sparks Revolutions
Around the World, ABCNEWS (July 22, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/WN/youtube-facebooktwitter-social-media-revolutionize-politics/story?id=11230480#.UK_OG6WE-fQ (describing how
social media can either help a candidate win a national campaign or destroy one in seconds); JD
Rucker, How Social Media Has Changed Political Campaigns, SOSHABLE (Dec. 11, 2011),
http://soshable.com/social-media-political-campaigns/ (examining how social media has been
used by presidential candidates and its impact on their campaigns).
160. See Traci Andrighetti, 6 Ways Facebook Has Changed Politics, ABOUT.COM,
http://facebook.about.com/od/Advanced/tp/6-Ways-Facebook-Has-Changed-Politics.htm
(last
visited June 9, 2013) (describing how Facebook has made politicians more accessible to the
general public).
161. Id. (noting that campaign organizers use the public’s feedback on candidates’
Facebook Pages strategically to “target specific groups to rally new and existing supporters and
raise funds”).
162. Twitter’s Retweet function and Pinterest’s Repin function may also constitute
speech, but a full analysis of those functions is beyond the scope of this Article. See supra note
25.
163. See Sharing, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/418076994900119 (last
visited June 9, 2013) (describing how to Share and how to control privacy when Sharing).
164. Id.
165. Id.
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constitutes speech under the First Amendment. This analysis applies
regardless of whether the content is original. In Turner Broadcasting
Systems, Inc. v. FCC,166 the Supreme Court found that the selection of
programming by cable networks was considered speech, even though the
networks had no hand in creating the content.167 Moreover, in Hurley, the
Court determined that including unwanted parade participants violated the
parade organizer’s speech rights because it forced the organizer to associate
with a message it did not wish to convey.168 Selecting what content to
Share is akin to selecting programming or parade participants. Users can
control the stories and posts with which they want to associate; each
association sends a message about the user. Therefore, Sharing content on
Facebook is a symbolic act that, like Liking, constitutes speech under the
First Amendment.
C.

Speech Conveyed by Clicking “Like” and Similar Online Actions Can
Be Protected Under the First Amendment

In the public-employment context,169 speech that meets the PickeringConnick test is protected by the First Amendment. This test requires that
the speech pertain to a matter of public concern and that the government’s
interest not outweigh the employee’s speech interest.170 Proper analysis of
employee speech under Pickering and Connick is highly fact-specific and
requires courts to thoroughly examine the circumstances of each case.
The Bland court engaged in only a cursory analysis in deciding
whether Carter’s clicking Like on Facebook was protected speech. The
little analysis the court did perform was unclear at best. The court
seemingly surmised that clicking Like is not speech at all—let alone
protected speech—but its discussion was incomplete. The remainder of this
Article outlines how the Bland court should have proceeded with its
application of the Pickering-Connick test. The court should first have
established that Liking constitutes speech under the First Amendment,
thereby requiring it to perform a Pickering-Connick analysis. In applying
this test, the court should have found that Carter spoke as a citizen on a
matter of public concern and that Carter’s interest outweighed the
government’s interest in this particular instance.
166. 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
167. Id. at 637.
168. 515 U.S. 557, 573-74 (1995).
169. Protection of Liking arises only in the realm of adverse public-employer action
because First Amendment protection requires action by a government entity against an individual
for his or her expressive activity. See supra Part II.C.3.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 82-84 (describing the Pickering-Connick test,
including Garcetti’s caveat for speech pursuant to official duties).
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Carter’s Clicking “Like” Was Speech as a Citizen on a Matter of
Public Concern

In order for Carter’s speech to be protected, he must have spoken as a
citizen on a matter of public concern. Carter’s clicking Like on a political
candidate’s Facebook Page constituted speech as a citizen because it was
not pursuant to his official duties. Nothing in Carter’s responsibilities at the
Sheriff’s office required him to Like any political candidates’ Facebook
Pages. Such expressive activity is available to any member of the general
public with access to the Internet and does not “owe its existence” to
employment at the Sheriff’s office.171 Regular citizens not employed at the
Sheriff’s office also Liked the candidates’ Pages; thus, voting or
campaigning obviously is not contingent on employment at the Sheriff’s
office.
Liking a political candidate’s Page touches on a matter of public
concern, as an election certainly qualifies as a “legitimate news interest”
and a “subject of general interest and . . . value” to the public.172 Carter
engaged in online political speech that pertained to a local public election
and was visible to his local community. Even though the network of people
who could see his Facebook activity was presumably larger than just those
people who could vote in the election, speech can be of general public
concern—and thus protected—even if “a relatively small segment of the
general public might be interested.”173 By clicking Like, Carter was
speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern, and the Bland court
should have proceeded to the next part of the Pickering-Connick analysis.
2.

Carter’s Clicking “Like” Was Protected Speech Under Pickering

After determining that Carter’s Like was speech as a citizen on a
matter of public concern, the court should have weighed Carter’s interest
against that of the government.174 Carter’s interest was significant because
his speech concerned an election, and the “electoral process, of course, is
the essence of our democracy.”175 Also, Carter’s speech substantially
involved a matter of public concern, requiring the Sheriff to meet a higher

171. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
172. City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83-84 (2004).
173. Roe v. City of S.F., 109 F.3d 578, 585 (9th Cir. 1997); Dishnow v. Sch. Dist., 77
F.3d 194, 197 (7th Cir. 1996).
174. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574-75 (1968) (holding that a publicschool teacher’s interest in commenting on school board decisions outweighed the school
district’s interest in suppressing that kind of commentary for the purpose of furthering efficient
administration of the public-school system).
175. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 821 (1978).
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burden when attempting to establish disruption.176 The Sheriff’s interest,
however, was minimal because Carter’s speech did not actually disrupt the
office’s operations based on the speech’s context, time, place, and manner.
Unlike handing out questionnaires at the office and asking coworkers to fill
them out while they are on the clock,177 clicking Like on Facebook is very
unobtrusive and does not require the involvement of any other employees.
Therefore, the Sheriff failed to meet his burden.
Carter’s interest in expressing his campaign views weighs particularly
heavily because political speech is afforded the highest protection from
government intrusion.178 Speech regarding public affairs goes beyond selfexpression to the heart of self-governance.179 Accordingly, the Supreme
Court has acknowledged “that the First Amendment has its fullest and most
urgent application to speech uttered during a campaign for political
office.”180
Further, little distinguishes Liking a politician’s Facebook Page from
similarly supporting a politician by displaying yard signs, which the
Supreme Court has established is a traditional and well-protected form of
political speech.181 As with yard signs, Liking a politician’s campaign Page
is an outward demonstration of support for the candidate that allows the
displayer to take ownership of the support, making it more personal than
other anonymous campaign signs.182 There is no adequate substitution for
such a form of political speech.183 That yard signs are tangible and external
public expressions of support is insufficient to distinguish them from Liking
a candidate on Facebook. If Carter had shown his support for the Sheriff’s
opponent by posting a sign in his front yard, his expression undoubtedly
would have been protected.184
Compared with Carter’s interest, the Sheriff’s interest was minimal.
While Carter’s public opposition could reduce the Sheriff’s credibility in
the eyes of his colleagues as well as the community, diminished credibility

176. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 153 (1983).
177. Id. at 141.
178. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (“The protection given speech and
press was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political
and social changes desired by the people.”).
179. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 196 (1992).
180. Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
181. See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text (discussing the speech components of
showing political support through the display of yard signs).
182. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 56 (1994) (affording heightened protection to
yard signs because their location is unique in that it “provide[s] information about the identity of
the ‘speaker’”).
183. See id. at 55 (“Our prior decisions have voiced particular concern with laws that
foreclose an entire medium of expression.”).
184. Id. at 58 (invalidating a city’s ban on nearly all residential signs).
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alone would likely be insufficient to actually cause internal strife and
discord.185 No evidence suggests that Carter’s speech caused him or the
other employees to perform their duties poorly. Instead, he was simply
exercising his constitutional right to speak freely, especially on political
matters. Therefore, Liking Adams’ campaign Page on Facebook was
protected speech. The court should have held that clicking Like was an
inappropriate reason for terminating Carter’s employment.
CONCLUSION
In light of the continuing expansion of social media, the current legal
framework must adapt to accommodate increased online activity.
Technological innovation in the past decade has created new forms of
speech not previously contemplated by lawmakers and courts—including
the Like and Share functions on Facebook. These emerging forms of
social-media expression constitute speech under the First Amendment tests
promulgated over the years by the Supreme Court. Additionally, many
instances of online speech should be protected, as people often use these
mediums to engage in political expression and to comment on matters of
public concern. In the public-employment context, an employee’s speech,
when made as a citizen on matters of public concern, will be protected by
the First Amendment if the employee’s interest outweighs the government’s
interest. When such speech does not disrupt the workplace, it should be
protected.
The court in Bland, however, incorrectly found that Liking was not
substantive enough to constitute protected speech. If other courts follow
Bland’s approach and deem Liking and similar online activities to be
outside the scope of the First Amendment, then individuals’ speech will be
censored and chilled in ways not contemplated by the Framers of the
Constitution. Courts should focus on the extensive generative aspects of
clicking Like, find that it is speech that must be protected, and bring their
First Amendment jurisprudence into the twenty-first century.

185. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1968) (acknowledging that, if
there had been “controversy and conflict,” the government’s interest would have been stronger).

